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u
J o: the Court, as for
society at large, this was
an era of enormous turmoil and
transformation. Indeed, I believe
it was "The Crucible of the
Modem Constitution."

When Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr., died in 1935, he left the bulk of his
estate to the United States Government.
This gift, known as the Oliver Wendell
Holmes Devise, sat in the Treasury for
about twenty years, until Congress set up
a Presidential Commission to determine
what to do with it. The principal use of
the money has been to fund a multivolume History of the United States
Supreme Court. The history of the
project itself has not always been a happy
one, for some of the authors have been
unable to complete their volumes.
Among them was ·one of my teachers,
the late Paul Freund, who was the first
general editor of the project and also
planned to write the volume on the
period in which Charles Evans Hughes
was Chief Justice, from 1930 to 1941.
I have had the good fortune to receive the
succeeding assignment to write this
volume.

I feel fortunate to be part of the Devise
History not only because it places me in
a wonderful neighborhood of authors,
but also because it is a tremendously
important project; its period of gestation
has been very long, but so will be its
shelf-life. And I feel particularly fortunate
to have the Hughes Court assignment not
only because I have already spent
considerable time studying the Hughes
Court - in what seems like a prior life,
I wrote a dissertation on Hughes as Chief
Justice - but also because of the
importance of the period. For the Court,
as for society at large, this was an era of
enormous turmoil and transformation.
Indeed, I believe it was 'The Crucible of
the Modern Constitution." That, at any
rate, will be the subtitle of my volume.
The period began with what has been
called the old constitutionalism still
apparently dominant, continued through
the crisis that culminated in the struggle
over Franklin Roosevelt's plan to pack
the Court in 1937, and ended as the
Justices appointed by Roosevelt consolidated their hold on the Court and on the
dramatically new constitutionalism that
still prevails.

So I have a story to tell and a mystery
to solve. The story is of how this transformation was achieved. And at the heart of
the story lies this mystery: In the spring
of 1937, shortly after Roosevelt's landslide re-election victory and during the
height of the Court-packing battle, the
Court seemed suddenly to become more
liberal. To what extent, if any, did these
political factors account for this apparent
switch? But implicit in this question, as
I have phrased it, is another: To what
extent was there actually a switch?
At the broadest level, of course there
was: Constitutional law was far different
in 1941 from what it was in 1930.
Indeed, the old constitutionalism was
effectively dead as soon as Roosevelt's
appointees began to replace the conservative Four Horsemen in the fall of 1937.
Liberal decisions resulting from these
personnel changes do not represent a
response by the Court to political
pressure; the new Justices were part of
the victorious side of 1936, not its
cowered foes. But because these person-
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flipped heads three times in a row
and then tails three times in a row,
a Justice acting conscientiously
might decide a run of cases on one
side of the line and then a second
run on the other side.
nel changes occurred so soon after the
Court-packing battle concluded, they
may make it harder to discern what the
Court's reaction to political pressure was.
Certainly, in the spring of 1937, while
the battle was hot, the Court issued a
flurry of significant decisions reaching
liberal results, far different from the
results of an earlier flurry of significant
decisions in 1936. The most important
cases break down into three sets, which
we may refer to as the minimum wage,
general welfare, and commerce clause
cases. In 1936, in Morehead v. New York
ex rel. Tipaldo, the Court held a state
minimum wage law invalid, but the next
year, in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
the Court upheld such a law in overturning the precedent on which Morehead
was based. In 1936, in United States v.
Butler, the Court held that the Agricultural Adjustment Act had exceeded the
federal government's power to tax and
spend, but in the Social Security Cases of
193 7 the Court upheld the exercise of
those powers in the Social Security Act.
In 1936, in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,
the Court held invalid a Congressional
attempt under the commerce clause to
regulate labor relations in a basic productive industry, but in 1937, in NLRB v.
]ones & Laughlin Steel Corp., the Court
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upheld a far more sweeping regulation of
labor relations, also under the commerce
power.
These developments were dramatic,
but we must be cautious in concluding
whether, or to what extent, the 1937
decisions represented a sudden adoption
of a new ideology. I believe that to
answer these questions requires a great
deal of attention to the grubby details of
individual Justices and individual cases.
It is tempting to think of the Court
organically, as an institution that moves
and makes strategic decisions like an
army. Perhaps this model is an appropriate portrayal of the Court when John
Marshall dominated it. But it does not
come close to reflecting the Court of early
1937. Obviously, the Court as a whole,
acting in conference, could not have been
a strategic decisionmaker; it was too
badly divided. There were blocs on the
court, four Justices on the right and three
on the left, that held informal caucuses at
which they presumably discussed tactics
for conference. But even assuming each
bloc remained cohesive (which was not
always so) neither could prevail in any
case without support from the middle;
the conservative Four Horsemen needed
the vote of either Chief Justice Hughes or
Owen Roberts, and the liberals needed
both their votes.

If there was a strategic decisionmaker,
therefore, it would have had to be one of
these two Justices. Some have thought
that this was a role played by Hughes. He
was, after all, the Chief Justice, he was a
commanding figure, and he stood
ideologically near the center of the Court.
But there is no basis for concluding that
he had strategic control over the Court,
and there is sound reason for concluding
that he did not. Indeed, Justice Brandeis
told Felix Frankurter at a crucial moment
that Hughes was depressed because he
had no control over the Court. Before the
crisis, Hughes was in the dissent in too
many cases of political significance to
suppose that he had any real measure of
control. Hughes did not solicit his
colleagues for votes, and he seems to
have taken an austere view of his role and
the decisionmaking process of the Court:
The Justices each had their say in conference, they voted, and they moved on to
the next case.
Then how about Justice Roberts? He
was not in strategic control of the Court;
he controlled no one's vote but his own,
and he does not seem to have had
significant persuasive power over his
colleagues. But certainly Roberts had a

great degree of control over the Court's
decisions, because on many significant
issues he was the man in the middle, the
Justice most likely to join the conservative four to make a majority.
The question, then, should not be
phrased as whether, or to what extent,
the Court was affected by political
pressure. The key question is whether
Justice Roberts was affected by political
pressure; a subsidiary question is
whether Chief Justice Hughes, who also
might be thought to have done some
switching in 1937, was so affected. To
adapt terms used by Graham Allison in
his celebrated study, Essence of Decision:
Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, if we
want to understand the Court's course of
decisions, we are better off dealing not
within Model II, treating the Court as a
monolithic entity, but within Model lll,
emphasizing the roles of the individual
players.
I emphasize this point not just out of
persnicketiness. It is important both for
understanding what happened in 193 7
and for assessing its significance. First,
as to the assessment of significance:
Suppose that what I shall call the political
hypothesis - that political pressure
explains the course of decisions appears to be correct. It is probably far
more difficult to draw historically
interesting generalizations from the
proposition that Roberts, or perhaps

Hughes and Roberts, responded to
political pressure than it would be to
draw such generalizations from the
proposition that the Court responded to
such pressure.
In understanding what happened,
phrasing the question in terms of the
Court rather than of Justice Roberts and
Chief Justice Hughes probably would
make little difference if we could reliably
think of decisions by the Court under
this model: Any issue is represented by a
point on a continuum running from left
to right, and the Justices by fixed links in
a rigid chain, running from left to right
with Roberts in the middle. If the chain
comes down with five or more links to
the left of the critical point, then the
liberals win, and otherwise the conservatives win.
Now, this model does have some
explanatory power, because it rests
implicitly on two premises that are
usually true. First, judges tend to act
consistently on a given issue. Thus, if
Justice A is more conservative (whatever
that may mean) than Justice B on issue 1
on one occasion, chances are strong that,
absent something unusual happening,
A will be more conservative than B on
issue 1 on another occasion. Second,
there is a substantial correlation between

certain issues. That is, if we know that A is
more conservative than B on issue 1, we
may well be able to predict how they will
stand in relation to one another on issue 2.
The trouble is that neither of these
premises is inevitably true - or anywhere close. Each Justice is subject to his
own set of influences, and they may
differ, in a multivariate way, from one
Justice to another. (The masculine
gender, by the way, is appropriate for the
Court of the 1930s.) This means that the
Justices cannot be put on a simple
continuum. The problem for analysis is
in part, but not only, that a given Justice
may be more liberal on some issues,
relative to his colleagues, than on other
issues. The more difficult aspect of the
problem is that any Justice, even one who
seems moderate on most issues, might be
affected to a substantial extent by a given
factor that seems far less important to his
colleagues. If one nevertheless knew with
confidence the full panoply of a given
Justice's views on matters coming before
the Court, then one could test whether
his votes and opinions consistently
reflected those views. But such confidence is, of course, difficult to attain.
To a large extent, a Justice's views are
revealed only through those votes and
opinions themselves. And this creates at
least three significant difficulties.
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Most obvious perhaps is a large
problem of circularity. Suppose that a
Justice votes on the conservative side of
Case 1 and on the liberal side of Case 2.
This does not necessarily mean that
anything strange happened, or that the
Justice must have responded to political
pressure between the two cases - even if
it so happens that a political event that
might be thought to have created leftward pressure occurred during that
interval. It might be that there is a
distinction between the two cases that
made the liberal side appear more
persuasive in Case 2 than in Case 1; to a
large extent, the business of appellate
judging, and the method by which judgemade law grows, consists of distinguishing cases, invoking a given doctrine in
one case but not in another because of
material differences between the cases.
But if the political factor also provides a
plausible explanation for the pair of
votes, it may be difficult to know
whether this substantive distinction
between the two cases really was a
significant factor motivating the Justice's
conduct.
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The same points apply to sets of cases.
Suppose a Justice has a batch of conservative votes in one time period and a
batch of liberal votes in a later time
period. This might be because a political
factor intervened, and some historians
seem to regard this inference - that the
Justice altered his ideological stance, at
least temporarily - as inevitable. But it is
not. Just as a fair coin will sometimes be
flipped heads three times in a row and
then tails three times in a row, a Justice
acting conscientiously might decide a run
of cases on one side of the line and then a
second run on the other side.
Second, even putting aside political
factors, simply because creative lawyering
can expose a potentially material distinction between two cases, it by no means
follows that this is a difference that
actually persuaded the individual Justice
in question. I have suggested that some
factor that might appear relatively
unimportant to most Justices, or most
observers, may appear critical to one
Justice. If we are lucky, we may be able
to discern these, but I do not think we
always can. I find it very interesting that
in 1946, when Merlo Pusey, in the course
of preparing his prize-winning biography
of Hughes, asked Roberts to account for
his conduct in the minimum wage cases,
Roberts' "initial, semifacetious reply", as

Pusey characterized it, was: "Who knows
what causes a judge to decide as he does?
Maybe the breakfast he had has something to do with it." And it may well be
that, in the case of Roberts especially, no
matter how deeply and accurately we
may analyze the factors motivating a
Justice's decisions, we will be left with a
residue of apparent randomness - a
degree to which, though some consistent
set of factors might be at work, it will be
essentially impossible for us to recognize
what they are. There is a significant irony
here, I think: To the extent that such
factors as the Justice's breakfast help
explain conduct that might otherwise
appear inconsistent, a political explanation is not necessary.
Finally, because of the group nature of
the Court's work, its opinions provide
only a limited insight into the beliefs of a
particular Justice. The Hughes Court was
sharply divided, of course, but as compared to the modem Court it was much
less fragmented; often there was a
dissent, but in contrast to today cases in
which there were more than two opinions were relatively rare. Ordinarily, a
Justice would go along with an opinion
that reached the result he favored,
without feeling the need to write sepa-

believe that, notwithstanding these difficulties, Hughes'
judicial ideology can be mapped out in some detail. On some
issues, he was very liberal: In the general area of civil rights
and civil liberties, I believe there was no member of the
Court more liberal. Nearly as strong a statement could be
made with respect to the question of the power of the state
to regulate prices, including wages, and to overcome
private contractual arrangements.

rately simply because he did not agree
with every statement contained in the
opinion. Thus, to a large extent a Justice
had two principal options in any given
case - to join the majority or to dissent
- and the Justice's vote does not in itself
give more information than which of
those two options he preferred; a Justice's
concurrence in an opinion did not
demonstrate that he agreed with it in its
entirety. Of course, the Justice's own
opinions are a better guide to his views,
but at times the author might be willing
to alter the text to make sure that he
retained the concurrence of his colleagues.
I believe that, notwithstanding these
difficulties, Hughes' judicial ideology can
be mapped out in some detail. On some
issues, he was very liberal: In the general
area of civil rights and civil liberties, I
believe there was no member of the
Court more liberal. Nearly as strong a
statement could be made with respect to
the question of the power of the state to
regulate prices, including wages, and to
overcome private contractual arrangements. (I put aside the troublesome
question of why judicial activism is
generally considered liberal when what
are deemed to be civil rights or civil
liberties are at issue, but conservative
when asserted rights against state eco-

nomic power are at issue.) When the
reach of the federal government's powers
was at stake, he still tended to be liberal
- that is, hospitable to such power though more cautiously so. On many tax
matters, however, he was far more
conservative, sometimes voting to the
right of Justice Roberts, and he was
similarly conservative when he believed
freedom of individual opportunity was at
stake. And certain issues seemed to
matter to him so much that they could
make him appear, in some contexts, to be
one of the most conservative members of
the Court. More than any other Justice, it
seems, he was willing to put weight on
constitutional restrictions against delegation of legislative authority; Brandeis
reported that he was "crazy" about
confiscation; and he had a distinctive,
highly judicialized view of proper
administration.

Furthermore, I believe that, with an
understanding of Hughes' views, we can
state with a rather high degree of confidence that his votes were not affected by
political factors, either the public reaction
to the Court's decisions, or the Roosevelt
landslide of 1936, or the Court-packing
battle. I have presented a rather full
argument elsewhere, in an article entitled
Switching Time and Other Thought
Experiments: The Hughes Court and
Constitutional Transformation, 142 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 1891 (1994) , and will summarize
it briefly here.
Any case for a switch must be based
primarily on the three sets of cases I have
described above - the minimum wage ,
general welfare, and commerce clause
cases. Hughes clearly did not switch in
the minimum wage cases; he had been in
the liberal minority in Morehead in 1936,
and the views that he established as law
in West Coast Hotel case in 1937 were
ones that he had long espoused. Nor was
there a substantive switch for Hughes in
the "general welfare" cases. In Butler in
1936, he had voted against the particular
exercise of the Government's taxing and
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spending power there at issue, an aspect
of the Agricultural Adjustment Act that
appeared coercive to him. But he clearly
favored the expansive general statement
of the Government's power in Roberts'
opinion for the majority; this, too,
echoed a view that he had long held.
Indeed, Roberts later told Felix Frankfurter that he had included that dictum
"just to please the Chief." In the Social
Security Cases of 193 7, Hughes favored
the exercise of the spending power but these were much stronger cases for
the Government, and so they appeared
not only to Hughes and Roberts but also
to two of the four conservative justices,
Van Devanter and Sutherland.
As for the commerce clause cases, it
appears to me that Hughes' opinion for a
bare majority of the Court in]ones &
Laughlin in 193 7 is not genuinely consistent with the commerce aspect of his
separate opinion the previous year in
Carter , at least not according to any
reasoning that commanded Hughes'
conscientious adherence. But it is Carter,
not Jones & Laughlin, that is the aberra-
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tion. The discussion of the commerce
power in]ones & Laughlin is written in
Hughes' most magisterial and expansive
style, and it is consistent with the entire
sweep of his career, going back to his
days as an Associate justice. The commerce passage in Hughes' Carter opinion,
by contrast, is brief, conclusory, and
cryptic, and unnecessary given the way
he would have resolved the case. I
suspect it did not represent his genuine
views, and that he inserted it for some
political motive. His commerce discussion in Carter ended with what was in
effect a plea to the public to get off the
backs of the Court, amending the
Constitution if the Court's interpretation
of the commerce power seemed intolerable; this advertisement, I believe, may
have provided the motivation for Hughes'
skimpy substantive discussion, rather
than vice versa. In any event, there is no
basis for concluding that Hughes was
pushed into ]ones & Laughlin by
political pressure.

As for Roberts, I can not speak with
nearly so much confidence. This is in
part because I have not spent as much
time studying Roberts. But it is also, I
suspect, because to a certain extent
Roberts defies understanding. His views
were not as well settled as Hughes', and
they appear to have been considerably
more idiosyncratic. Thus, his views seem
to have changed over time, and even
without a significant passage of time he
acted in ways that would appear to most
observers as inconsistent; inconsistency
in the eyes of others, however, might
mean simply that Roberts was motivated
by factors that appeared more important
to him than to others.
I do have some conclusions, which I
have explored more fully in the Switching
Time article, regarding Roberts and the
political hypothesis. Roberts' conduct in
the minimum wage cases was strange,
and his later explanation of it does not
fully hold up. He joined the conservatives
in Morehead and the liberals in West Coast
Hotel, and later asserted that he did so
because in the latter case, but not the
former, the question of whether to
overrule the precedent that most strongly

supported the conservatives was not
presented. This is not so; at least arguably, that question was actually presented
more clearly by counsel in Morehead. But
I think that it is at least clear that Roberts'
vote in West Coast Hotel, and not the one
in Morehead, reflected his previously
expressed substantive views. Why he was
so much readier in West Coast Hotel to
overcome any procedural scruples that
had prevented him from joining the
liberals in Morehead is not so clear. He
may have decided that he was wrong on
this matter, or that the conservatives had
taken advantage of him. And he may
have been shaken by the furious public
reaction to Morehead. But the timing of
the Court's actions in West Coast Hotel,
among other factors, suggests that neither
the 1936 election nor the Court-packing
battle had anything to do with the
matter.
Roberts' votes in the "general welfare"
cases can probably be explained in the
same way that Hughes', as well as those
of Van Devanter and Sutherland, can the Social Security Cases appeared to be
stronger ones for the Government than
Butler did. Roberts appears to have been
significantly less enthused about the
federal spending power than Hughes
was, even at the time Roberts wrote
broadly about it in Butler, and on the
commerce clause his record on the Court
before 1937 was far more conservative
than Hughes'. The most notable, but not
the only illustration of this is Roberts'
concurrence with the majority in Carter.
I am inclined, therefore, to believe that
Roberts' concurrence with the liberal side
of the Court in Jones & Laughlin represented a break for him. But there is no
reason to doubt its sincerity; Roberts was
capable of changing his mind on short
order, his Butler opinion suggests that he
was then beginning to expand his views of
national powers, and his later conduct

showed no reservations about Jones &
Laughlin. Apart from the timing, there is no
reason to believe that the Court-packing
plan influenced Roberts, and there is good
reason to believe it did not: It was not
immediately clear what the political impact
of upholding the National Labor Relations
Act would be, and the Government's
victory was far more sweeping that one
might expect if the decision was inconsistent with Roberts' conscientious beliefs but
motivated by a manipulative desire to help
defeat Court-packing. Perhaps the storm of
sitdown strikes then compelling national
attention made Roberts believe that a
national solution to labor problems was
necessary, but I do not believe it is possible
to be sure.
I have said that I aim to tell a story,
but I have not promised that it would be
a simple, neat story. It will not satisfy
those who wish to view the Court as an
ordinary political institution, subject to
ordinary political pressures. Nor will it
gratify those who are committed to the
view that no justice could have been
affected by such pressures. And it may
discomfit those who would like to draw
conclusions about the Court of the
Hughes era without doing the hard work
of examining the particulars of the cases
it decided, and trying to do so with the
mindset of the individuals who happened
to constitute the Court. But I hope that it
will yield us a fuller picture than we now
have of how it happened that the Hughes
Court transformed American constitutional law.
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